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Emergent Properties:
Interdisciplinary Team Teaching in Literature and Biology
Nels C. Pearson and Ashley Byun McKay
with student authors James Ballanco, Heather Boyd, Greg Burke, and
Shawne Lomauro
Abstract
In this essay, we reflect on the outcomes of our interdisciplinary, team-taught,
undergraduate core course in modern literature and evolutionary biology--a
course designed to study the problems of identifying the emergence of distinctly
“human” beings. The essay reflects on the positive, unexpected outcomes that
we experienced, especially in student writing, via the metaphor of “emergent
properties,” a biological term that refers to how new and complex traits, behaviors, or life forms emerge from the interaction of “simpler units” which in themselves would not produce these properties. Given that so much of the course
content came from the students themselves—in particular, from their interest in
the question of human consciousness as an evolved trait—we have incorporated excerpts from student essays that were produced for the course. These
excerpts are preceded by student reflections and accompanied by observations
about the compelling fashion in which students synthesized not only scientific
and literary content, but also objective and subjective writing styles.

Keywords
interdisciplinary teaching, team-teaching, classroom practices, Arts and
Sciences, student writing

Introduction
This essay concerns the unique learning experiences which emerged from a
team-taught, interdisciplinary course called “Minds and Bodies” at Fairfield
University, a Jesuit liberal-arts institution of 4,000 students in Fairfield,
Connecticut. Part of a core course sequence for first and second-year students
in the Honors Program, “Minds and Bodies” is taught annually, but with dif
different faculty teams. As professors of biology and English literature, ours
was a particularly unusual pairing and as such, we were both enthusiastic
and apprehensive about how we could combine these two fields into a single
cohesive course. Deciding upon objectives and learning outcomes was especially challenging, as we realized just how deep the differences were between
worcester.edu/currents
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Literature’s metaphoric and philosophical mode of
understanding nature and Biology’s empirical mode.
Resisting the urge to teach these as separate ways of
looking at nature—to present them simply as two “different disciplinary lenses”—was a daily challenge.
The course that we ultimately developed centered
upon the question of whether there is a mind or soul
distinct from the biochemical brain and body. We
approached the question from both evolutionary and
philosophical angles, introducing students to the difficulty of distinguishing distinctly human traits and
cognitive faculties from those in the animal kingdom
while also engaging them in the humanist dilemma of
the inability to affirm metaphysical absolutes or origins.
Alternating between case studies in animal evolution
and philosophical responses to evolution and genetics
in 19th and 20th-century literature, our goal was to
initiate student reflection on the possibility that human
capacities such as love, language, or justice are not
unique to our species, but properties that emerge along
an evolutionary continuum.
In Biology, an “emergent property” is a new and
often unpredictable trait that arises through interactions of the individual components of a system.
Independent of the system, the individual component
would not exhibit that particular property, behavior or
function. As the semester progressed, we and our students became increasingly interested in how the emergence of complex biological properties such as male
sexual displays and bird flocking might also explain
how humans developed certain traits such as emotion,
social behavior, cognitive function, and perhaps even
what we refer to as the “mind.” Although we had not
planned it to be a focus of the course, we found ourselves increasingly occupied by this topic: could human
consciousness, and associated traits such as love and
free will, be the emergent products of mere biochemical
and cellular interactions, and if so, then might this not
help to resolve the opposition between the autonomous
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self and the inflexible laws of nature that had troubled
writers like Mary Shelley, Alfred Tennyson, and Fyodor
Dostoevsky? Could it explain how free will would actually evolve according to a natural law (traditionally its
philosophical nemesis)? Our main purpose, here, is not
to provide a detailed answer to that question (although
our student contributors, below, engage it from different perspectives). Rather, it is to propose what this
spontaneous development indicated in and of itself,
namely, that the phenomena of emergent properties
was actually happening in the class. That is to say, as
the philosophical components of literary study and the
empirical components of Biology interacted, a new
matrix of innovative and often unexpected topics and
ideas was evolving, especially in student writing and
discussions. As in nature, our content had emerged
spontaneously out of a collocation of life forms.
This unplanned content included students working through their personal discomfort regarding the
ambiguity of what it means to be human (especially
when “hard science” was helping to fuel the problem
rather than solve it), developing novel social and political perspectives and new views on spirituality and the
autonomous self (including the challenge of integrating
science into a religious viewpoint), and having vociferous arguments about how to resolve the apparent
contradiction between distinct consciousness and natural law. Because of the interdisciplinary nature of the
course, we had agreed to encourage a range of possible
writing styles, with the one stipulation that students
develop their ideas through the balanced integration
of citations from both scientific and literary sources.
When we read the results, we noticed that the unique
evolution of our course’s subject matter or topical focus
was reflected not only in the content of student’s essays,
but also in their form. Just as their subjects were original, so too did their writing cross discursive borders
between source-driven research writing, the personal
or reflective essay, and thesis-driven interpretive and
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analytical argument. Indeed, we often noted that it was
when students were using close readings of literature to
illuminate or interrogate concepts in genetics and evolution, and vice versa, that their compelling synthesis or
juxtaposition of scientific and literary modes of inquiry
was most evident.
Below are excerpts from four student essays, each
of which illustrates these general observations about
the course and its outcomes. These essays were among
the best in the course, but the main reason we select
them is that they best demonstrate the original combinations of scientific and literary concepts or approaches
that the students themselves had generated. A few of
the essays we received could be considered more technically proficient or rhetorically consistent than these,
but less innovative, while many others were neither as
original nor as technically sound. What really struck us
as different about all the papers was that so many of
them could only have been produced by independent
thinking about the different ways that course concepts
fit together. Even the least provocative among them
tended to have a compelling, untypical insight. The ones
below had many. Each excerpt is preceded by a student
reflection on his or her processes of thinking, writing,
and discovery and framed by our own comments and
perspectives.
Heather Boyd

The process of writing this paper was overwhelming at
times as I reflected on the nature of humanity and attempted
to ground rather large ideas in biology and literature. These
thoughts infringed upon my indoctrinated view of mankind. Often, I struggled to articulate what I was slowly
coming to understand. Through conversations with my
professors and then by my writing, I was able to wrestle
with the implications of my findings. If I accept that every
action I take is rooted in biology, how can I also believe that
a supreme being created me as an unique individual with
free will? By experiencing this process of confusion and, at
times, frustration, I was able to unlock ideas which I had
worcester.edu/currents
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believed should be thought about in purely religious terms.
Ironically, the answer I found did not undermine my belief
in God or the dignity of the individual, but did result in an
even more awe-inspiring view of the world.
Literary works repeatedly reflect upon the implications of the considerable evidence which refutes the
existence of uniquely human traits. Even the capacity
for language, emotions, and complex intelligence, three
traits generally assumed to be exclusive to humans,
appear to be subject to natural law. This likelihood
raises several philosophic questions that authors Ian
McEwan and Fyodor Dostoevsky grappled with in their
respective novels Saturday and Notes from Underground.
Their important concern is this: if the complexity of
human language, the depth of human emotions, and
the degree to which humans can learn and reason are
all determined by genes, then what choices are left to
free will?
According to Tom Siegfried (2008), “Free will is
not the defining feature of humanness, modern neuroscience implies, but is rather an illusion that endures
only because biochemical complexity conceals the
mechanism of decision making” (para. 3). In his novel
Saturday, Ian McEwan (2005) explores this challenge
to the notion of autonomous consciousness. The main
character, neurosurgeon Henry Perowne, believes that
every human action is attributable to genetics:
One kilogram or so of cells actually encodes
information, holds experiences, memories, dream and
intentions. He doesn’t doubt that in years to come, the
coding mechanism will be known, though it might not
be in his lifetime. Just like the digital codes of replicating life held within DNA, the brain’s fundamental
secret will be laid open one day. (p. 262-263)
At the end of Saturday, Perowne uses this understanding of genetic inevitability to assess Baxter, a
London street criminal, as suffering from Huntington’s
disease. By acknowledging that this disease predisposes
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an individual to behavioral and psychiatric problems,
Perowne is able to ignore Baxter’s attack on his family
and operate on him. But McEwan leaves the question
open: isn’t Perowne’s decision to operate on Baxter still
precisely that: a willful choice to act ethically?
That depends on how, exactly, we define “free will”.
According to Siegfried (2008), “The issue is understanding the complex circulation of molecular information
that is massaged and manipulated at various stations
by neural systems tuned to multiple decision-making
considerations. That process is free will, even if it isn’t
really free” (para. 9). In the end, the neurochemistry of
the brain controls decision-making. Free will is merely
the end, not the means to an end. In other words, if a
person defines free will as being able to make decisions,
then the fact that neurological firings in the brain lead
a person to making the decision is irrelevant.
Accepting that free will is subject to natural law
is a central theme in Fyodor Dostoevsky’s Notes from
Underground (1994). Dostoevsky describes the ranting
of a man who is confronted with this very conundrum—
“Once it’s proved to you that you descended from an
ape, there’s no use making a wry face, just take it for
what it is” (p. 13). “It” pertains to the fact that human
beings are subject to the same natural law as apes. In
the Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Edward Wasiolek (1967)
discusses the fear of the underground man: “If the laws
of nature really exist, then ‘free will’ is an illusion that
will be dispelled by reason” (p. 411). The reason behind
any choice, even the choice to deny this irrefutable
truth, is biological. This circular logic drives the underground man mad as he cannot stop asking questions
and over-thinking his situation.
I cannot help but wonder why the assumption
that human beings are subject to natural law offends
so many people. I cannot refute that the choices I make
are determined by natural law or that that my experience of empathy, love, and grief is traceable to chemicals. But Natural law’s innate tendency for variation
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has also led to the birth of individuality. Every brain
is unique. Although human brains consist of the same
fundamental components, from slight variations, different personalities and tendencies emerge. If your brain
is unique, and your brain is part of the unique person
that you are, then why do some people have a problem
accepting the truth about free will?
Heather’s essay is a compelling mixture of reflective
and analytical writing. Using her citations as signposts
to mark the specific places where her thinking was
challenged, her larger objective is to offer a more
personal review of how she came to understand the
paradoxes of natural law and the human will. We liked
the way that this form helps to show her not merely
receiving knowledge, but engaging it in deep dialogue
with an existing religious viewpoint that she didn’t allow
to be static or inflexible. The possible reconciliations that
she offers, in the idea that variation is a key component
of evolution and in the sense of awe regarding the
“magnificence” of evolutionary processes, are important
discoveries that the class had begun to make, thanks in
large part to Heather’s contributions.

Although these realizations were hard to come to,
I am starting to see the grandeur in my new understanding of free will. I once had believed that knowledge of
biological processes, genetics, and natural selection was
irrelevant to my philosophic view of humanity. I was
entirely wrong. The process of reconciling spirituality
and science is an integral part in one’s exploration of
their life philosophies. Furthermore, spirituality cannot
be used in place of natural law or to explain what science
has yet revealed. I believe that spirituality exists outside
of natural law. Some people think that believing that
human choices are shaped by natural law means that
human beings are not in control of their destiny, but
rather, everything is predetermined. Even Dostoevsky
grappled with this same concept. My sense of purpose
has yet to falter even in the face of the irrefutable truth
that human behavior is subject to the same natural law
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that govern all plant and animal life as I do believe I
can make choices and change the world around me.
James Ballanco

My paper focuses primarily on the phenomenon known
as consciousness. I wanted to prove that consciousness is
merely a complex biological function—thus disproving that
it is a manifestation of some God-given human superiority.
To do this, I looked for examples in literature, supported by
modern science, in which the human mind showed that it
was subject to the laws of nature. I struggled as I wrote this
because the conclusion I came to was both provocative and
unsettling. It seemed wrong to suggest that human beings
are only as free as certain biological processes allow. In the
end, I looked to the writing of Tennyson to support the idea
that an absence of free will can actually be thought of as a
soothing gift that might even be embraced.
Human consciousness can be thought of as an
emergent property that has evolved over many generations. This complex trait emerges through the
interactions of nerve cells or neurons, and supporting
cells known as glia. In “Animal Intelligence and the
Evolution of the Human Mind,” Dicke and Roth
(2008) review evidence that the unique cognitive abilities of the human brain over the animal brain are not
due to any large scale alteration of brain architecture
but rather, due to microscopic upgrades in these fundamental units. More neurons and thicker myelin
sheaths both which allow the human brain to process
more information faster has probably played a key role
in allowing our brains to reach a level of complexity
that is not biologically possible in other animals (paras.
13-17).
Is the human mind a set of simple neural interactions that, when examined as a whole, results in
the emergent property which we understand as consciousness? Has consciousness emerged as a result of
evolution in the same way as other seemingly complex
traits such as the heart or human fingerprints? In Ian
worcester.edu/currents
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McEwan’s novel Saturday (2005), neurosurgeon Henry
Perowne seems to subscribe to this belief:
“…the brain’s fundamental secret will be laid
open one day…Could it ever be explained, how
matter becomes conscious? . . .the secret will be
revealed…the explanations will refine themselves
into an irrefutable truth about consciousness” (p.
262-263).
Though there is not yet concrete evidence of how our
biological matter becomes conscious, there are many
examples that seem to illustrate that human consciousness is indeed a trait that emerges according biological
laws.
Being a biological function subject to natural law,
human consciousness can be impaired, altered, or even
temporarily suspended in accordance with biological
properties and interactions. For example, during sexual
intercourse, levels of the neurotransmitter dopamine are
greatly increased in the brain. Dopamine, the body’s
reward system, results in a feeling of ecstasy that results
in a temporary lapse of consciousness (Robinson, 2006).
This idea is mirrored in Saturday when the narrator
describes Henry’s experience of sexual intercourse with

James’s approach seemed to us highly original:
McEwan’s novel certainly cries out to be analyzed
in terms of actual neurochemical research, but
given our specialized fields, chances are that no
scholar has yet done so. James not only moves
smoothly between paraphrase of current scientific
studies and interpretive close reading of literature,
but extends his observations across several
different literary works, showing a continuity of
concerns running through Tennyson, McEwan,
and the science of the brain. His essay also
captures one of our own favorite discoveries in the
class, which is the unexpectedly efficient way that
biology and literature can be combined to help us
explore the question of what the mind “is,” and
from what it derives.
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his wife: “Now he is freed from thought, from memory,
from the passing seconds and from the state of the
world. Sex is a different medium, refracting time and
sense, a biological hyperspace as remote from conscious
existence as dreams, or as water is from air” (McEwan,
2005, p. 52). Here, Henry’s temporary loss of consciousness serves as a cathartic exercise. However, it
also shows how drastically human consciousness can be
influenced by changing levels of dopamine [. . . .]
Though human consciousness can be altered by
natural processes, better evidence for its evolutionary
emergence may lie in the ways that humans have learned
to control it. For example, the use of anesthesia during
surgery demonstrates the way biological elements can
be used to turn consciousness on and off. To study how
consciousness can be altered by means of anesthesia,
researchers from the University of California-Irvine
performed experiments (1999) using positron emission tomography (PET). Their findings suggested that
halothane, an inhalant anesthesia, decreased activity
between the thalamus and the mid-brain (as cited in
“Anesthesia,” 2009). Thus “wake-up” signals cannot be
processed, resulting in unconsciousness (paras. 5-6).
This ability to manipulate consciousness is portrayed
in Saturday, when Perowne is thinking about the surgery his wife Rosalind needed to correct her vision.
He remembers how the anesthesiologist injected the
needle and “then she was gone” (McEwan, 2005, p.
44), illustrating how astonishingly easy it is to control
human consciousness. Perowne finds an odd comfort in
the principle that this memory reconfirms, namely that
consciousness, and the yearning self that we associate
with it, are functions of brain chemistry. [ . . .]
There is no question that humans possess many
notable differences from animals but those differences
may only be in degree rather than in kind. It is undeniable that humans, just as animals, are bound by biological limitations that challenge any simple understanding
of individuality. In his long poem In Memoriam, Alfred
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Lord Tennyson (2004) understands that it is futile for
him to blame nature for the death of his friend and
that death is a part of natural law over which he has
no influence. He writes, “I curse not nature, no, nor
death / for nothing is that errs from law” (p. 7-8). He
accepts that all aspects of the world are subject to this
same natural law by stating that nothing can exist if it
deviates from that law. For in the end, everything dies.
And at that time, the exalted human consciousness
ultimately is reduced to nothing more than “a weight of
nerves without a mind” (Tennyson, 2004, p. 7).
Greg Burke

The male bower bird is renowned for its ornate and completely individualistic nests which it builds to attract a
mate. During class, one student made an unsubstantiated
remark that this behavior can be explained by the bird’s
genes and therefore there is no choice or creativity involved
in this very unique action. Upon hearing this I realized
that we, as humans, assume that we alone have choice and
creativity. If we can defer any examples of such traits in
the rest of the animal kingdom by ascribing them to mere
genetics that are “out of their control,” we can remain at the
top of our own self constructed pyramid or Scala Naturae.
This was the first bias that presented itself to me and caused
me to begin asking more questions.
One fundamental and universally accepted saying
is, “you can’t find what you are not looking for.” I came
to realize that this remains particularly true in science.
The most significant barrier in our ability to identify
animal traits lies within the perceptive boundaries of
being human. If an animal has an ability or a trait that
we do not, then we cannot fairly perceive or associate
with that trait. It will go either unnoticed or insufficiently understood. An illustration of this bias is seen in
studies that have shown that female and male scientists
can interpret particular interactions between opposite
genders in a species in very different ways and “that
where males [scientists] see dominance, females see
equality” (Bekoff, 2002, p. 77). If we cannot even avoid
worcester.edu/currents
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projecting our human gender identities onto animals,
then how can we ever be sure that we are truly perceiving what is present in the organisms we study?
Once an observation is made, regardless of how
unbiased it might be, it then is subject to anthropomorphism, a humanization of non-human behaviors,
actions, or traits. To understand how anthropomorphism limits what we can understand about animals,
just think about Hallucigenia, a Middle Cambrian aged
fossil form the Burgess Shale formation in British
Columbia, Canada. This creature’s name comes from
the fact that it is one of the strangest looking species
ever found in nature. Scientists had great difficulty trying to make sense of the animal: “how can you describe
an animal when you don’t even know which side is up,
which end front and which back?” (Gould, 1990, p.
154). This frustration illustrates the idea that with no
perspective or point of reference other than our own,
identification and interpretation of animal traits may
be inadequate.
Sometimes we assign human reactions and emotions to animals in an effort to associate with our nonhuman companions on a human level. For example, in
McEwan’s novel Saturday (2005), neurosurgeon Henry
Perowne will “never drop a live lobster into boiling
water” (p. 128) since its set of polymodal nocipetor sites
are similar to ours, and he extrapolates from this that
the lobster must perceive pain in the same ways that we
do. By humanizing an animal, we create a closeness to
another species and sometimes a sense of solidarity, but
this practice arguably just reflects our own consciousness rather than the experiences of the life forms we
perceive.
As I became more aware of how this bias operates,
I also became hopelessly conscious of inherent human
biases in general, and how impossible it is to understand anything, even our own selves, objectively. I found
myself continually questioning all things that I once
took as truth and it began to frighten me. I soon real-
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Greg’s discovery that scientific methods are subject
to inevitable bias is essentially epistemological (i.e.,
a discovery of how we form knowledge). It is also an
example of interdisciplinary “emergence” because his
initial curiosity about this problem, which would not
typically be cultivated in an empirically-based course
of study, was instead ignited by fiction and poetry that
insistently asked whether or not humans can know
themselves objectively. In turn, however, it was only by
studying the actual “hard” science that Greg saw this
literary theme take on meaning and become real. His
ideas reveal a dynamic interchange between the two
subjects that also corresponds to the formal features of
his writing, as he moves between adroit deployment of
scientific vocabulary and an almost confessional level of
personal/reflective writing.

ized, much like Dostoevsky’s underground man, “that
to be overly conscious is a sickness, a real, thorough
sickness” (Dostoevsky, 1994, p. 6). All that I have
learned this semester suggests that humans may not be
so distinct from animals. We seem to place ourselves at
the top of Scala naturae because we value most highly
those traits which we believe unique to us. However,
it seems that we are part of the same spectrum as other
animals and that this supposedly natural hierarchy has
been turned on its side. Am I then subject to the same
fate as my animal brothers? Or, as Tennyson asks, “Are
God and Nature then at strife, / That Nature lends
such evil dreams? / So careful of the type she seems, /
So careless of the single life” (Tennyson, 2004, p. 40).
Does this mean life is meaningless? This possibility has
kept me up at night and I wonder if I have to just “go
ahead and accept it, there’s nothing to be done, because
two times two is mathematics. Try objecting to that!”
(Dostoyevsky, 1994, p. 13). Indeed, how can I possibly
argue with what seems to be the truth? The implications of this seem outrageously bleak to me, but I do
not see the point in arguing if it is, in fact, the truth.
And so I am left alone in a fog trying to find my way to
a light I am not sure exists.
Pearson & McKay – Emergent Properties
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Shawne Lomauro

Academia is much like a two edged sword. Learning is a
passion, but along with it comes a responsibility of knowledge, so strong, that it can make you question why we seek
to expand our horizons of thought. This feeling of angst has
become a typical part of my academic life, so researching
and delving into it only seemed like a normal reaction. The
nexus of literature and biology gave me just the platform
to begin this exploration. The use of human language gives
the optimal viewpoint into the lengths that human thought
and creativity can go. Meanwhile, evolutionary biology
allowed me a space in which to question the necessity and,
ultimately, the diminishing returns of that ability. While
studying what I began to call the destructive capacity of
human thought, the vast array of emotions I felt along
my path to knowledge only seemed more normal. Deeper
knowledge, it seems, is truly a Promethean gift.
The underground man’s misery, set beside his
assertion that he is more intelligent than all other men,
shows that higher levels of intelligence as seen in the
human species may indeed be detrimental to our development and success. The underground man claims, “I’m
guilty of being more intelligent than all those around
me” (Dostoyevsky, 1994, p. 88). Although he recognizes
within himself the ability for higher intelligence, that
intelligence reaches a point of diminishing returns.
He cannot better himself with this knowledge, and it
instead leads to his isolation and demise. This predicament also suggests that other animals have the biological capacity for higher levels of cognition, but such an
adaptation has not yet occurred. This has potentially
startling ramifications, given that, at least according
to evolutionary theory, beneficial characteristics tend
to repeat themselves independently within nature. For
example, the highly advantageous camera eyes found
in humans and in octopi is believed to have evolved
independently in these two lineages, suggesting that
advantageous traits evolve multiple times in nature.
The wing, and subsequent benefit of flight, have inde86
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pendently evolved in species such as bats, birds, and
insects. The fact that intelligence itself has not been
reproduced—despite the fact that “Human intelligence
may be best likened to an upgrade of the cognitive
capacities of nonhuman primates rather than an exceptionally advanced form of cognition” (Dicke & Roth,
2008, para. 1)—suggests that it may not be as much of a
beneficial characteristic as it is generally believed to be.
In other words, it is possible that intelligence as seen in
the human species is not a benefit to long-term growth.
In our current socially constructed realities, it
seems as though intelligence needs to be checked by
some type of greater force in order to maintain a state of
nonviolent and peaceful equilibrium. Kathleen Gibson
(2002), for example, points out that “higher orders of
intentionality are mental constructs that create relationships among ideas and embed ideas within each other
to form higher order constructs” (p. 16). This hierarchy
of intentionality can ultimately lead to deception.
According to Daniel Dennett’s rubric of intentionality
(1998), for example, “’x believes that p’ represents first
order intentionality; ‘x wants y to believe that x is hungry’ represents second order intentionality; and ‘x wants
y to believe that x believes he is all alone’ represents
third order intentionality” (as cited in Gibson, 2002, p.
Shawne’s essay is probably the best example of
interdisciplinary thought as an emergent property. It
combines associative, interpretive and critical thought
in compelling ways. As she interprets the theme of
burdensome knowledge in Dostoevsky via close
reading, she also associates it with scientific studies
of deception or confusion in the communication of
intention. She then contextualizes these ideas not
in philosophical reasoning about the paradoxes of
knowing, but in terms of observations that Biologists
are just beginning to make about the ways that human
intelligence may not be a fully adaptive, environmentally
successful trait. Finally, she applies this entire matrix of
ideas to a third discipline, that of social justice, a topic
that is deeply relevant to her academic and personal life.
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16). If gone unchecked, this increasing complexity of
intentionality can have adverse ends insofar as deception can lead to things such as tension and fighting.
It can also lead to an isolating “madness,” as it can
be argued that it is this third order intentionality that
plagues the life of the underground man. The underground man’s desire for the reader to believe that he is
all alone in his miserable-ness is a depiction of the third
order of intentionality. He notes, “Now I’m living out
my life in a corner, trying to console myself with the
stupid, useless excuse that an intelligent man cannot
turn himself into anything” (Dostoyevsky, 1994, p. 86).
If we analyze this claim in terms of the three orders of
intentionality, we notice that the underground man is
both exercising the third order and pushing beyond it.
He is trying to convince the reader not only that he is
alone, but also that he believes himself to be completely
detached from the rest of society. This is evidence of
the capacity for deception inherent in the third order,
because indeed he cannot be detached from society if
he is relating his aloneness to someone else. He is also
arguably moving beyond the third order, and not just
participating in it, when he tries to convince himself
that he is in his current predicament because only foolish men are successful, and that he is too intelligent to
turn himself into anything. His predicament therefore
encapsulates a sobering challenge not only to the notion
that our intelligence is preferred by evolution, but also
to the belief that we can employ it to engineer a just
society.
Conclusion
These outcomes remind us that much of the content
generated in interdisciplinary teaching and learning
is difficult to predict—that it takes shape out of the
ideas, tangential questions, strange and unique leaps of
associative thought that arise from the collocation of
different modes of inquiry and knowledge. However,
they also may suggest that this unpredictability is more
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biological than we might suppose. Like biological
emergence, it arguably happens not because two distinct
elements or in this case, two self-contained “disciplines”
are interacting, but because the disciplinary limits cease
to contain or control the live elements or components
within them. The concepts, skills, and objectives that
we tend to think of as comprising a discipline begin
to interact independent of their original systems,
evolving into a new, interactive system of inquiry
and expression. Upon reflection, perhaps it was our
decision to not force traditional learning outcomes in
either Biology or English literature upon our students.
We eventually came to accept that in a course such as
Minds and Bodies, the learning cannot and should not
be constrained through rigid predetermined objectives
but rather allowed to emerge naturally; the real challenge is finding a way to encourage that emergence and
as professors, accepting the unpredictability. Cardinal
Newman (1959), who also used a biological metaphor
to describe the integration of core learning in the Jesuit
tradition, was perhaps thinking of something similar
when he proposed that “all branches of knowledge [in
a core curriculum] are . . . not isolated and independent
of one another, but form together a whole system; . .
. they run into each other, and complete each other”
(p. 221). The important difference, as we experienced
it, is that this “whole system” is neither closed nor
predetermined.

––
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